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Introduction – a specific issue for multiculturalism 
 
The most visible and heavily reported problems of different cultures living together, 
unsurprisingly perhaps, centre on housing and accommodation. The principal areas of tension 
appear to be two-fold. First, recent immigrants being housed in already-deprived areas.
1
 
Second, Romany Travellers, with their own form of desperation, trying to settle en masse 
against the wishes of locals and often in breach of planning laws. This problem has grown in 
recent times as their nomadic lifestyle has been increasingly outlawed, beginning most 
notably in recent times with section 39 of the Public Order Act 1986, expressed to prevent 
New Age Travellers from converging on or around festival sites, such as Stonehenge, but 
used from day one against Romany Travellers on the waysides of England.
2
  
 
These facts alone are enough to explain the tensions between different cultures. But a slightly 
deeper look reveals a rather more contradictory picture. It involves the politicians, who pass 
equality laws to protect such people, yet with their public comments, provoke animosity 
towards the same people. The matter is aggravated by some more subtle, but equally populist, 
judicial comments. 
  
These comments, alongside some of saddest events in recent British social history, are 
considered below. It is suggested that Britain’s equality laws cannot achieve their potential to 
facilitate multiculturalism whilst being undermined by the lawmakers. 
 
 
Words and events 
 
In the late 1990's, Tony Blair’s government operated a ‘dispersal’ policy for asylum seekers. 
The thinking behind this was to avoid spreading refugees too thinly and leaving them without 
community support, and at the same time avoid ghettos and disproportionate burdens on the 
local authorities, such as those at the port of Dover or Heathrow airport.
3
 
 
Accordingly, Glasgow City Council contracted with central Government to house refugees 
over 5 years for £110m.
4
 The council placed them in its most deprived district, Sighthill. 
Many locals – whose area had been deprived of council spending – watched blocks of flats 
being refurbished and occupied by foreigners. The resentment grew. There were warnings 
that the council were not doing enough to educate the population about the plight of the 
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refugees, and some of the terrible stories behind their arrival in Britain.
5
 In April 2001, 
Glasgow police reported a steady increase in crime, including assaults, against refugees 
housed in the Sighthill district of Glasgow.
6
 Local human rights lawyer, Aamer Anwar, 
observed that: ‘The council has failed to produce even one leaflet explaining to people in 
Sighthill who these asylum seekers are, where they have come from and why they are here.’7 
This vacuum was filled with racist leafleting by ring-wing groups.
8
 
 
And so, in the Spring of 2001, a time when political leaders should have been defusing the 
tensions, the Conservative Party (opposition) leader, William Hague, made a pre-election 
speech at the party’s Harrogate conference, culminating with heavily trailed (and 
subsequently spun) line: ‘Let me take you to a foreign land - Britain after a second term of 
Tony Blair’. This section of the speech actually focussed on EU monetary policy threatening 
Britain’s economic independence. But the subtext was clear. The speech railed at Labour’s 
asylum policy, promising to establish refugee camps and to ‘lock up’ all asylum seekers until 
their claims were processed, thus assimilating refugees with ‘bogus asylum seekers’ and 
‘criminals’.9 That year, The Daily Mail featured the phrase ‘bogus asylum seeker’ in 66 
articles.
10
 The message was that asylum seekers – bogus or otherwise - are a ‘problem’, a 
threat to Britain as we know it, and one likely to be associated with crime. 
 
None of this was directed at the cumulating problems in Sighthill, but of course, the best that 
can be said is that it did nothing to defuse the tensions there. In the early hours of August 5
th
, 
a 22 year old Kurd refugee, Firsat Dag, was stabbed to death. Even then, a tabloid newspaper 
proclaimed (incorrectly) on its front page that the victim had ‘conned’ his way into Britain as 
a bogus asylum seeker.
11
 The attacks continued.
12
 
 
Was Hague’s speech a one-off? It seems not. A year later, the Home Secretary (David 
Blunket) - the minster responsible for asylum policy and a prominent member of the Labour 
Government  - asserted that the children of asylum seekers were ‘swamping’ some schools.13  
 
More recently, one his successors was at it again. Here are some extracts from Teresa May’s 
speech to the Conservative Party conference in October 2011.
14
  She stated: ‘When a terrorist 
cannot be deported on human rights grounds, all our rights are threatened.’  
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 From this apparently isolated statement she goes on to say, in the next sentence, ‘And as 
Conservatives, we understand too the need to reduce and control immigration’, thus 
suggesting that terrorism is an ‘immigration problem’. She then spent three minutes listing 
‘problems’ of immigration (on housing, public services, and infrastructure), concluding with 
this inevitable attack on the Human Rights Act: 
 
‘...we need to make sure that we're not constrained from removing foreign nationals who, in 
all sanity, should have no right to be here. 
 
We all know the stories about the Human Rights Act. The violent drug dealer who cannot be 
sent home because his daughter - for whom he pays no maintenance - lives here. The robber 
who cannot be removed because he has a girlfriend. The illegal immigrant who cannot be 
deported because - and I am not making this up - he had a pet cat.’ 
 
Within a space of four minutes, she put it in the air that the Human Rights Act prevents the 
deportation of terrorists and serious criminals, solely because they had acquired a pet. 
 
Of course, the ‘pet cat’ story was made up.15 The case in question involved a Bolivian student 
who had committed no crimes, and who was discovered living with his partner two years 
after his visa had expired.
16
 He won his appeal against deportation because the Home Office 
had not followed its own rules on deporting persons with family ties in Britain. The cat was 
mentioned by the judge as part of the picture of the man’s family life in Britain.17 It was not 
decisive. Nevertheless, for Theresa May, this is why ‘the Human Rights Act needs to go’. 
And so, a benign immigration case involving someone not a criminal was associated with 
terrorism. 
 
This man’s story has been aired now and again since the tribunal ruling, which actually was 
given back in 2008.
18
 The story appeared under headlines such as: The ‘Rights’ I Would Give 
These Scum,
19
 Rights That Make a Mockery of Justice,
20
 Fugitive Foreign Killers Use Your 
Money to Avoid Being Deported,
21
 The Secret of Our Imported Crime Wave is Finally Out,
22
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102 Foreign Offenders We Can't Deport,
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 Killer and rapist use 'right to family life' to stay in 
Britain.
24
 
 
The year 2011 also saw all politicians rounding on a group of Romany Travellers, sited at 
Dale Farm, in Essex, England. This lawful but overcrowded site expanded into an adjacent 
disused scrapyard, where many Romany Travellers settled without planning permission. 
After a ten year legal battle, they were due for eviction. When asked in Parliament to support 
the eviction, the Prime Minister, David Cameron stated: 
What I would say is that it is a basic issue of fairness: everyone in this country has to 
obey the law, including the law about planning permission and about building on 
green belt land. Where this has been done without permission it is an illegal 
development and so those people should move away.
25
 
This typified the inflammatory language being poured over the issue.  The Prime Minister 
made three misleading points that have been repeated ad infinitum by politicians and the 
media. First, the reference to an ‘illegal development’ suggests that the travellers were 
criminals from day one. In fact, the only criminal wrongdoing here was the resisting of the 
enforcement notice.
26
 Establishing homes on the land (much of which was owned by the 
travellers) was not a crime, it was a breach of planning law, a civil matter. Anyone else, say, 
resisting a planning order (or indeed, most civil law orders), is not referred to as criminal.
27
 
People trying to keep a roof over their families’ heads and maintaining stability for their 
children and elders, are thus associated with thugs and thieves. Second, it is a fundamental 
twin principle of discrimination law that those in similar situations should be treated the 
same, whilst those in different situations should be treated differently.
28
 Romany Travellers 
are in a different situation to most, yet the politicians, and with them, the media,
29
 harp on 
about obeying the same law, as if that alone exonerated anyone from discrimination. Third, 
although within the Green Belt, the site actually was on a disused scrapyard, which was not 
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quite the image portrayed by the Prime Minister of criminal tinkers and travellers despoiling 
England’s green and pleasant land. 
Words and the law 
 
It is not just the politicians who make the law. Judges interpret statutes and create common 
law, thus setting precedents. These decisions, and perhaps their accompanying comments, 
can also make a difference. Their record is mixed, with some dreadful low points.  
 
Back in 1983, in Mandla v Dowell Lee,
30
 the rules of a private school dictated that boys had 
to wear the school uniform (including a cap), and keep their hair cut 'so as not to touch the 
collar'. The school refused Gurinder Singh admission as a pupil because he would not comply 
with those rules. As an orthodox Sikh, he was obliged not to cut his hair, and to restrain it by 
wearing a turban; so he could not wear the school cap. The Court of Appeal held that as Sikhs 
could show no common biological characteristic, they did not form a racial group for the 
claim to proceed.
31
 This scientific approach is completely at odds with multiculturalism. 
Further, the Court attacked the Commission for Racial Equality for supporting the case, 
whilst one appeal judge told Mandla (and no doubt ‘foreigners’ in general): ‘If persons wish 
to insist on wearing bathing suits they cannot reasonably insist on admission to a nudist 
colony...’32 The House of Lords reversed on all counts. Nonetheless, it shows senior judges 
deciding an accusation of discrimination by standards completely at odds with 
multiculturalism. 
 
In the same year, a differently constituted Court of Appeal was again trying to restrict the 
law’s potential to improve intercultural relations  , this time successfully, with no reversal by 
the House of Lords. In Perera v Civil Service Commission (no. 2),
33
 an advertisement for a 
legal assistant stated that candidates with a good command of the English language, 
experience in the UK and with British nationality, would be at an ‘advantage’. It was held 
that these ‘mere preferences’ did not amount to a requirement or condition within the 
meaning of the Race Relations Act 1976. To come within the Act, the Court stated, an 
employer should elevate the preference to a requirement or ‘absolute bar’ which has to be 
complied with, in order to qualify for the job. Stephenson, LJ justified the decision thus: 
 
 
‘... a brilliant man whose personal qualities made him suitable as a legal assistant 
might well have been sent forward... in spite of being, perhaps, below standard on his 
knowledge of English...’
34
 
 
 
Of course, a court willing to see the purpose of the statute fulfilled would have reasoned that 
it was a requirement to have any of those characteristics to achieve the ‘advantage’. But 
Stephenson’s LJ seemingly undramatic comment reveals a far more serious problem 
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underlying British cultural relations. If a candidate has to be ‘brilliant’ to compensate for a 
nationality-based ‘weakness’ then he is at a disadvantage because of his nationality. A 
‘brilliant foreigner’  will obtain a post otherwise suitable for an ‘average Englishman’. The 
comment disguises this bigotry to outsiders by suggesting that Britain is a fair place where 
any ‘brilliant’ person can ‘make it’, no matter what their race.  
 
A few years later, the Court of Appeal stuck to its guns, in Meer v London Borough of Tower 
Hamlets.
35
 Here, the employer attached twelve ‘selection criteria’ to an advertised post. One 
of these was experience in the Tower Hamlets district. That put persons of Indian origin 
(including Mr Meer) at a disadvantage because a higher than average proportion of them 
were new to the area. The Court of Appeal rejected Meer’s claim of indirect discrimination 
holding that the criterion was again a mere preference. Staughton, LJ justified this decision 
by considering the alternative: the law of indirect discrimination ‘would have such an 
extraordinarily wide and capricious effect’. It did not occur to the judge that the law would 
only have that effect if indirect discrimination were extraordinarily wide and capricious. Of 
course, the sub-text is that discrimination like this is not the problem; the problem is 
discrimination law, which should not be allowed to get out of control. It took EU Directives 
effectively to reverse Perera and Meer, by replacing the statutory phrase requirement or 
condition with the more liberal provision criterion or practice.
36
 
 
More openly expressed opinions followed. In Khan v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire,
37
 
Lord Woolf  MR, (as he then was) stated: ‘To regard a person as acting unlawfully when he 
had not been motivated either consciously or unconsciously by any discriminatory motive is 
hardly likely to assist the objective of promoting harmonious racial relations.’ In Nagarajan v 
London Regional Transport,
38
 Lord Browne-Wilkinson dissented: ‘To introduce something 
akin to strict liability into the Acts which will lead to individuals being stamped as racially 
discriminatory... where these matters were not consciously in their minds when they acted is 
unlikely to recommend the legislation to the public as being fair and proper protection for the 
minorities that they are seeking to protect.’ 
 
These comments do not actually represent the law, which covers unintentional as well as 
intentional discrimination. But the message is that perceived public opinion should not be 
challenged. The law should go as far as challenging patent bigotry, but not ‘innocent’ or 
subconscious causes of disadvantage (where of course, most problems begin), for fear 
causing resentment by the general public. As well as the matter of presuming that all British 
people share this opinion, and that a judge considers himself to be in touch with public 
opinion, these comments undermine the ambition of equality law and policy. 
 
In sum, the cases suggest that anti-discrimination law should provide equality by the 
standards of the ‘white Englishman’, do no more than provide for the ‘brilliant foreigner’, not 
venture into potentially ‘wide and capricious’ areas of inequality, nor the beyond general 
public’s perception of inequality, which is confined to patent bigotry. 
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The judges’ comments have a lot in common with the political and media comments 
highlighted above. First, they were factually incorrect, or misleading. Second, they were 
populist, suggesting that Britain is a fair country, and foreigners and minorities 'had nothing 
to complain about'. Third, they reinforce the suggestion that this ‘fairness’ is to be judged 
from the perspective of the ‘white Englishman’ Fourth, in suggesting that the law should 
require no more than avoiding patent bigotry, they do nothing to educate the legal world, and 
the broader population, about the subtleties of discrimination the law actually seeks to 
address.  
 
Finally, there is the legal aspect of the Dale Farm eviction and the illegal/unlawful 
dichotomy.
39
 In the last case confirming the eviction, the High Court referred to the criminal 
law 30 times. It was expressed as a major factor in its reasoning. By comparison, in a well-
publicised planning case involving a large house built without permission by deceit (behind a 
screen of straw bales), the High Court, in confirming its demolition for breach of planning 
law, did not refer to the criminal law once.
40
 The implication is that ‘outsiders’ and minorities 
who breach planning law are criminals, whilst white men simply run into a minor civil 
matter. They are regarded as ‘cheeky’, ‘daring’, and ‘maverick’.  
 
 
 
Where is the compassion? 
 
Most of North America and Western Europe has assumed a policy of multiculturalism. 
Inherent in this a celebration of difference, and tolerance.
41
 This suggests that the key is 
psychological, or emotional, rather than formal. Human rights law originates, partly at least, 
from human compassion, or the milk of human kindness. People generally have a sense of 
compassion, especially for the underdog. This appears at odds with the resistance by ordinary 
(so presumably decent) people to much discrimination law, especially positive action 
programmes
42
 and the truism that anti-discrimination laws are enacted to combat prejudices 
in mainstream society. The comments highlighted above - all devoid of compassion, 
celebrations of difference, and tolerance - reveal that the general public’s perception is 
important in defining, interpreting, and implementing, the law. But in complex societies 
where so much disadvantage is invisible to an uninformed public, relying on public 
perception is no more useful than asking for a jury’s opinion after providing it with 
newspapers instead of the evidence. It becomes obvious that there is a duty on politicians and 
judges to educate the public in the hard truths behind a asylum seeker’s plight and the real 
disadvantages that exist in society, so triggering their innate human compassion. The neglect 
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of this duty breeds cynicism rather than compassion, which in turn feeds into the political, 
media, and legal statements and decisions. 
 
The judiciary can take a particular lead. For the law to be structured around human 
compassion is not as fanciful as it first seems. The Canadian Supreme Court has developed its 
human rights jurisprudence around the theme of ‘human dignity’.43 Indeed, this principle can 
be detected in most human rights discourses and even is expressed in Britain’s Equality Acts 
and the equality directives.
44
 There is no doubt it can resolve issues in discrimination law,
45
 
even if it is not the single guiding principle.
46
  
 
With a similar flavour, the US Supreme Court fixes the level of scrutiny of allegedly 
discriminatory state and federal actions according to the suffering of the group question; it 
looks for a history of purposeful and invidious discrimination, based on prejudice or 
inaccurate stereotypes, against a class without political power.
47
 These observations about the 
state of groups in society are as loaded with compassion as they are with intellectual rigour. 
They show that positive human emotions can be identified and realised in law.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Human rights and equality laws are rooted in compassion. Politicians and judges create 
equality laws, yet their public pronouncements often undermine these same laws. Left alone, 
at best, our equality law can only manage to enforce a celebration of difference and tolerance, 
which of course, is a miserable and mean-spirited way of going about things. Given active 
support, our equality law could facilitate such achievements, a far more worthwhile goal. 
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